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How Chinese managers construct their post-merger identification after an 
acquisition in Europe? 
 
Abstract 
Organizational identification has attracted many interests in past years. Employees who identify 
with the organization are typically loyal to their organizations. It is necessary to understand how 
employees construe and reconcile their identification when they face tremendous organizational 
changes in M&As. Majority studies focused on antecedents of post-merger identification (PMI) 
in developed economies. How employees from emerging market construct PMI is still under 
explored. Our study adopted a qualitative case study to investigate how Chinese managers 
construct PMI after acquiring a western company. Our findings reveal that Chinese managers 
take acquisition as an opportunity for their identity enhancement. Though identity enhancement 
exposes them in dramatic organizational changes, Chinese managers don’t perceive these 
changes as threats because of organizational identity flexibility. Interestingly, two non-merging 
identities are flexibly bridged and merged by newly constructed organizations, and finally 
contribute to a high PMI. 
 
Introduction  
Organizational identity and identification have become key interests in organizational studies in 
the past decades. These concepts have been linked to organizational changes (Van Knippenberg et 
al., 2002) and organizational bias (Terry and Callan, 1998). Based on the social identity approach 
(Turner et al., 1987), organizational identity can be defined as “stereotypic attributes of an 
organization that are conferred upon it by those for whom the organization is relevant and 
meaningful” (Haslam, Postmes and Ellemers, 2003, p. 360). Organizational identification refers to 
“the perception of oneness with or belongingness to” the organization (Ashforth and Mael, 1989, 
p. 34). 
 Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) involve dramatic organizational changes which can 
trigger low post-merger identification (PMI) (Gleibs, Mummendey and Noack, 2008). After M&As, 
organizational members often need to let go of their recurrent organizational identity and 
reconstruct their identity as members belonging to the new organization (Terry and O’Brien, 2001). 
The identity reconstruction might threaten employees, especially for those coming from a low 
status premerger organization. Specifically, one of the premerger organizations may be superior to 
the other one in terms of competence, technological competitiveness. The low status premerger 
organizational members could be threatened by making sense that they have to follow the other 
group’s identity (Amiot, Terry and McKimmie, 2012). In turn, the identity threat will lead to low 
PMI, which is detrimental to successful M&As (Bartels et al., 2006).  
 Comparing with the extensive research on PMI in the West, Chinese PMI construction has 
scarcely been mentioned. The deal value of Chinese cross-border M&As has reached a tenfold rise 
in the past ten years (Chenshao Report, 2018). The limited attention on Chinese PMI construction 
hinders our understanding of the full range of identification construction in M&As. Thus, in this 
study, we fill this gap by conducting a qualitative in-depth case study after Chinese acquiring a 
European manufacturing firm. We use a grounded theory approach for theory building (Haslam, 
Postmes and Ellemers, 2003; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). By exploring complicated organizational 
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phenomenon in the naturalistic context (Piekkari, Welch and Paavilainen, 2009), we provide a full 
explanation of how PMI construction fit together with causes.  
 Our findings reveal that, as the acquirer, Chinese managers take acquisition as an 
opportunity for their identity enhancement. Identity enhancement needs identity transformation 
which exposes them in dramatic organizational changes. Chinese managers don’t perceive these 
changes as threats because of organizational identity flexibility, it prevents employees from 
experiencing uncertainties in M&As. Interestingly, two non-merging identities are bridged and 
merged by newly constructed organizations, and finally contribute to a high PMI. 
 The paper makes two contributions to PMI literatures. First, our paper fills the gap of 
investigating how dominate but low status group construct their post-merger identification. This 
gap should not be ignored because of its practical necessity. Less distinguished companies from 
emerging markets are increasingly acquiring distinguished western companies. How to deal with 
the mixed effects of dominance and status become vital to their success of M&As. Second, this 
article argues that organizational identity flexibility can trigger a high PMI. If employees are 
immune to the organizational changes, losing a sense of continuity might not lead to a low PMI. 
This provides a new way to help increase employees’ PMI beyond the frequent focus on the sense 
of continuity. 
 
Literature Review 
1. Organizational identification in M&As  
The past few decades have witnessed the continuing proliferation of M&As. However, literatures 
show that plenty of M&As are failure cases which cannot meet the expectations of acquirers (Zhou, 
Xie and Wang, 2016; Bhaumik, Owolabi and Pal, 2018). Within these literatures, frequent 
explanations for these failure M&As focus mainly on social and human factors (Vaara, 2002; 
Colman and Lunnan, 2011; Joshi, Sanchez and Mudde, 2018). Indeed, M&As underperformance 
are frequently attributed to employees’ low PMI because of dramatic organizational changes 
(Gleibs, Mummendey and Noack, 2008). 
 From social identity perspective, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) can be defined as “a 
formal recategorization of two social groups as one new group” (Van Knippenberg et al., 2002, p. 
234). The new group incorporates the acquirer and target group after acquisitions. The combination 
of two groups will inevitably bring about organizational changes (Haleblian et al., 2009). 
Employees may find themselves difficult to adapt to these changes, this may lead to their low PMI 
(Makamson, 2010; Giessner, 2011).  
 Organizational identity and identification have been used to explain different behaviors in 
organizations after M&As, including cooperative behavior (Gleibs, Mummendey and Noack, 2008) 
and organizational bias (Van Knippenberg and Hogg, 2018). It is grounded in the social identity 
approach which comprises social identity theory and self-categorization theory (Tajfel and Turner, 
1986; Turner et al., 1987). Self-categorization theory explains the impact of self-perception (“I” 
vs. “we”) for understanding mind and behavior of people. Whereas, in social identity theory, people 
define themselves as members of a social group (groups), an individual’s self-concept derives from 
his membership of the social group (groups) he belongs to, rather than himself. Post-merger 
identification (PMI) is theoretically interesting, because it is an important precursor of a successful 
acquisition (Colman and Lunnan, 2011). High PMI is positively related to job satisfaction and good 
performance (Van Dick et al., 2004; Lipponen, Wisse and Jetten, 2017). Correspondingly, low 
levels of PMI often hinder companies from realizing their strategic and financial goals of 
acquisitions (Giessner, 2016). 
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 The majority of studies on PMI have predominantly focused on the effect of pre-merger 
identification (Colman and Lunnan, 2011; Lipponen, Wisse and Jetten, 2017). After M&As, one 
organization, normally the acquiring organization, turns out to be more dominate (in terms of power 
differences) and influential in the new organization (Van Knippenberg et al., 2002). Terry et al. 
(2001) found that acquiring companies in M&As tended to have a higher status (in terms of 
technology or performance) than the other, and acquired companies in M&As were often connected 
to a loss of status (see also Haunschild et al., 1994). Notably, however, it is necessary to stress that 
status and dominance should not be treated as the same concept as determinant on PMI (Van 
Knippenberg et al., 2002; Ullrich, Wieseke and Dick, 2005). A tiny firm with a high technical 
status can be acquired by a more influential but less distinguished company. Thus, we argue that 
pre-merger organizational status and dominance are different concepts to affect PMI. 
 Colman & Lunnan (2011) explained that employees from a low status pre-merger 
organization might make sense of the acquisition as threats to their pre-merger identity, which often 
resulted in low PMI (Terry and O’Brien, 2001). Van Knippenberg et al. (2002) proposed that PMI 
was often higher for former members from a dominant organization than those from the dominated 
organization. Employees in dominant organizations often perceived post-merger organization as a 
continuation of their pre-merger organization, because they were larger or more powerful than the 
dominated group. 
 The dominant organization in M&As may often be the higher status organization, however, 
as we mention earlier, there are situations in which the dominate partner might be the lower status 
group (e.g. when a chain of budget stores takes over a prestigious designer store). Van Knippenberg 
et al. (2002) used the similar example to differentiate status and dominance, explaining the effect 
of dominance on PMI, but there is no deeper explanation on how this mixed status and dominance 
will influence PMI in M&As. Thus, it is theoretical interesting to fill the gap of investigating how 
the mixed effects of dominance and status will influence PMI, and what is the post-merger 
identification construction process behind these effects. This gap should not be ignored also 
because of practical necessity, as less distinguished companies from emerging markets are 
increasingly acquiring distinguished western companies, how to deal with the mixed effects of 
dominance and status become vital to their success of these cross-border M&As. 
2. Post-merger identification construction in Chinese cross-border M&As  
The deal value of Chinese cross-border M&As has increased and reached a tenfold rise in the past 
ten years (Chenshao Report, 2018). Chinese acquirers mainly target well-known western 
companies as a springboard to acquire strategic and technological assets (Deng, 2004). These 
acquisitions help Chinese companies to ‘catch up’ in terms of technology, brand, and management 
(Rui & Yip, 2008; Sun, 2018). We argue that Chinese acquisitions provide us a suitable context to 
study PMI in cross-border M&As, as employees in Chinese companies may experience dramatic 
organizational changes because of asymmetric technological and brand status.  
 Recently, researchers have increasingly focused on post-merger integration in Chinese 
M&As. It is argued as a critical antecedent of a successful acquisition (Zheng et al., 2016; 
Muralidharan, Wei and Liu, 2017). Management and technological abilities of target firms in 
developed countries are generally superior to Chinese enterprises. Different from traditional 
absorption, symbiosis or preservation approaches (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991), Liu & 
Woywode (2013) found that Chinese acquirers adopted a novel post-acquisition integration 
approach which was known as “light-touch” integration. They found that despite a high potential 
for synergy, Chinese did not pursue full integration in a fast manner but granted lots of autonomy 
to the acquired firms. It met the need of reducing uncertainties for acquired firms, but it would be 
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a challenge for Chinese acquirers to promote knowledge transfer (Zollo and Singh, 2004). In this 
way, Chinese acquirers tended to manipulate organizational structural changs, in order to achieve 
organizational learning and knowledge transferring from western acquired companies (Zou and 
Ghauri, 2008; Liu and Woywode, 2013). Despite these insights, literatures suggested that 
“organizational identity (who we are) may be as influential as culture (how we do things) in 
affecting the post-merger integration process” (Zaheer, Schomaker and Genc, 2003, p. 185). How 
Chinese managers react to these post-merger integration strategies in terms of organizational 
identification has scarcely been mentioned in literatures (Cooper et al., 2015). 
 This research pay attention to PMI construction by Chinese members of the acquiring 
organization after an acquisition of a European firm. We believe a better understanding of this issue 
should shed light on the success or failure of Chinese cross-border M&A. Hence, our central 
research question is: How Chinese members of the acquiring organization construct their PMI after 
an acquisition of a European organization. 
Methodology 
We employed a qualitative case study, as most appropriate for building theory and answering 
“how” questions related to complex processes (Gehman et al., 2017, p. 4). For instance, due to 
cultural differences and dramatic organizational changes, identity/identification construction 
process we examined in the study has been seen as a complex process in cross-border M&As 
(Vaara, 2002). Theory building from qualitative cases depends mainly on grounded theory 
approach where “researchers may have a guess about the constructs of the theory, but are 
fundamentally going in open-minded” (Gehman et al., 2017). Based on grounded theory, we broke 
data into first-order and second-order themes, and then abstracted at a higher level into third-order 
codes (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013). Without a preconception of relationships among the 
emerging third-order codes, we iterated among the literature, data and emergent theory to come up 
with explanations for the underlying logic of the emergent relationships. It was taken in our case 
study for not only generating new theory, but also elaborating existing theory in a complex 
organizational phenomena (Patvardhan, Gioia and Hamilton, 2015). Besides, theory building from 
cases fundamentally depends on a case study (Yin, 2009; Gehman et al., 2017). In this study, the 
single case study about the acquiring organization provided a rich empirical instance of PMI 
process. In summary, we addressed the PMI construction as theoretical focus by studying a specific 
case of a Sino-Western M&As.  
 
Research setting  
Alpha Holding is a Chinese privately-owned global group which consists of many international 
acquisitions. Alpha is one of Alpha Holding’s divisions which focuses on manufacturing low-end 
products. In order to improve the quality of products and gain access to the global market, Alpha 
Holding acquired the company Beta. The acquired western company Beta has a long history of 
manufacturing premium products and leading technological know-how in the industry. Being 
acquired by Alpha, Beta felt a threat for losing their brand reputation. In order to ease the threat, 
Alpha Holding allowed Beta to be independent after the acquisition. Three years later, Alpha 
Holding created a new organization – Alpha-A at the same location of Beta and was responsible 
for the cooperation between Alpha and Beta. The Alpha-A worked as a bridge between Alpha and 
Beta, managers from both organizations conducted joint projects based on Alpha-B. After eight 
years, a joint venture Alpha-B was created. The Alpha-B was established for formalizing the 
synergies for the direct collaboration within two organizations. Figure 1 displays the organizational 
structure. 
 5 
Figure 1. Overview of interrelation among organizations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data collection  
In accordance with our qualitative research approach, we adopted varied sources of data, including 
(1) semi-structured interviews with key Chinese informants who were involved in interactions with 
Western managers, (2) archival data about the acquiring Chinese company and the acquired 
European company, (3) observation in the acquiring company in China.  We conducted 32 
interviews, top management (division heads) and middle management (heads of units and 
functional departments) were distinguished. We conducted interviews in June 2017 (years 7 after 
the acquisition), January 2018 and July 2018. Our data collection fitted with the time span of the 
process that we were studying (Gehman et al., 2017). We did our pilot interviews right after we got 
access to the company in June 2017. From the pilot interview, we got the information that a new 
joint organization (Alpha-C) would be created in 2018. The organizational changes (e.g. structural 
changes) have a significant influence on identity change (Empson, 2004), thus, we started our 
process data collection right after the creation of Alpha-C. We went to China again in July 2018 
for data collecting, and the collaboration was viewed by some Alpha managers as successful. 
Interviews lasted 45-60 minutes. All interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed and exported to 
Nvivo for analysis. All interviews were translated from Chinese into English.  
Archival data. We gained access to public and private archival data, including the websites of three 
organization entities, peer-reviewed as well as media articles, we relied on archival data during all 
the research period, these archive data also served as an significant triangulation source for 
understanding events and mitigating possible “retrospective bias” in the interviews (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994).  
Observation. Finally, one of the authors spent over 30 hours in the key department of Alpha 
between June 2017 and August 2018. The author engaged in direct, non-participant observation of 
organizational actions, observing members' working routines and social interactions, engaging in 
informal conversations on topics the researcher interested in, gathering potentially data relating to 
personal and interpersonal issues of identity. Detailed notes concerning content of conversations 
were taken and exported to NVivo for analysis.  
 
Data Analysis 
We began our data analysis with early analysis which was “a rapid, practical way to do first-run 
data reduction without losing any of the basic information” (Miles et al., 1994). All the interviews 
were transcribed into Chinese texts (original language). We began the first order coding (open 
Alpha-B 
 
Alpha-A 
Alpha Holding  
Alpha Beta 
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coding) by reviewing and assigning initial texts including words, phrases, sentences or paragraphs 
into different categories and labelled these categories as first-order codes. We used in-vivo (Corbin 
and Strauss, 2008) codes which was used directly by interviewees, if the in-vivo codes were not 
available, we used a simple summary phrase to name the categories. 
 Next, based on the categories generated from first order coding, pattern coding was adopted, 
which was “a way of grouping the categories into a smaller number of themes or constructs” 
(Miles et al., 1994). Common themes were used to link together data fragments from differing but 
related categories developed in open coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). For example, we made 
sense of these related first-order codes as interviewees had a “perceived low status” as a second 
order code, when they demonstrated themselves as “students” when they met Beta managers. After 
that, we went back and forth between first-order codes and second-order themes until no new 
themes or codes emerged. 
 Finally, we got the emergent framework by gathering similar themes into more abstract 
dimensions and built relationship among different dimensions (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The data 
structure was pivotal, as we provided a graphic representation of how we progressed from raw data 
to themes in conducting the analyses. Emerging relationships among codes and theoretical linking 
were recorded in memos. Sequential and interactive relationships were traced, and we thereby 
transformed the original static coding dimensions into a dynamic process of identity construction.  
 
Results 
Figure 2 displays a coding scheme of our data structure. It demonstrates three main dimensions 
that emerged from our data analyses (the right side of the figure), as well as their constituent 
second-order themes and the first-order concepts.  
Figure 2. Data structure  
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First-order concept   second-order themes    Aggregate dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Organization status and dominance 
Alpha: Perceived as a low status organization 
Alpha managers perceived the acquired company Beta as a “Goddess” who had a higher status than 
acquirer Alpha. Beta was an organization which owned advanced technology, a high brand value, 
strong global presences and a long history; reversely, Alpha was viewed as a young company which 
had low technology, a short history and an inferior brand. Alpha managers encouraged their 
employees to learn from colleagues in the acquired company. Before communicating with Beta 
counterparts, employees were always well-prepared in terms of language and questions. In spite of 
these efforts, they described Beta managers as “not open” and “difficult to collaborate”. For 
instance,  
Statements that comparing with Beta, Alpha was viewed as a lower status 
organization in terms of technology and brand value. 
Examples of the lower status of Alpha was seen as reasonable and 
acceptable. 
Statements that Alpha managers should learn from Beta 
Descriptions that Alpha Holding being having key influential in the post-
acquisition integration e.g. Alpha Holding determining the strategic 
direction of Beta; Alpha Holding enabling technology transfer – power to 
big know-how from Europe to Alpha. 
Overall testimonies that Alpha Holding and Alpha are one and the same 
organization. 
 
Statements that Alpha minimize the identity disruptions of Beta. 
Examples of many identity and brand differences between Beta and Alpha. 
Overall perceived risk that Alpha can negatively impact Beta’s brand and 
technology if integration took place. 
Descriptions of Alpha and Beta should be kept as two separate 
organizations and calls for maintaining the separation.  
Statement that Alpha-B is Alpha’s R&D center, and it is an Alpha overseas 
organization.  
Alpha-B is viewed as a bridge between Alpha and Bate in terms of a 
knowledge transfer from Beta to Alpha through recruiting talent from Beta, 
enabling work on common Beta-Alpha innovation projects. 
Statements that Alpha learns and applies technology, processes from Beta 
Descriptions of Alpha-C being a joint venture between Alpha and Beta 
Testimonies that Beta and Alpha moved from two separate organizations 
into one team 
Further descriptions and testimonies of changes at Alpha in terms of 
organizational structure in order to improve performance and to satisfy 
customers’ expectations. 
Descriptions of “who we are”/ “who are we becoming” as the post-merger 
organization. 
Statements demonstrating embracing of the post-merger identity in terms of 
improved brand value and quality.  
Statements demonstrating their confidence towards future Alpha.  
 
Low status 
organization (1) 
Dominant 
organization (2) 
Non-merging 
identities  
 (3) 
Bridge identity (4) 
 
Merged identity (5) 
 
Pride of New 
Alpha (6) 
Organization 
status and 
dominance 
Organization
al Identity 
flexibility 
Post-merger 
identification 
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Yes, we were in a lower status in the beginning, then began to…It is also about working 
habit, including communication habit. For instance, we can’t get the answers we asked 
from them. In fact, Beta is actually not open for us at that time. No, they just don't want to 
talk to you.  
 For Chinese managers, the status difference was seen as understandable due to Alpha’s 
inferior technology to Beta. There was a huge knowledge gap between two organizations, if Beta 
was a college student, Alpha was a young kid in a kindergarten. The collaboration difficulties as 
mentioned before were triggered by status difference between two organizations. Chinese 
managers thought that different levels of technological know-how in these two organizations led 
to some difficulties in the communication: 
Very important is that we have different knowledge. (Our technical expertise) is not at the 
same level. They (Beta) are at a higher level, especially for the portraying and electrical 
(expertise), Beta is very strong in electrical (expertise) especially in using software to 
manage the electrical operation. It’s difficult to have a dialogue (communication) with them. 
You (Beta) are a college student; you (Alpha) are in the kindergarten. How to discuss the 
technology (with them)?  
Alpha Holding: perceived as a dominant organization 
Though recognizing Alpha as a low status group comparing with Beta, Chinese managers perceived 
Alpha Holding as the dominant organization. Though Beta was granted with considerable 
autonomy and had a high status in technological know-how, the Holding group was more 
influential in determining the strategy direction of Beta. Besides, Alpha Holding had power to 
enable technology transfer from Europe to Alpha by creating a new organization Alpha-B. 
Managers from Alpha therefore had chances to collaborate with Beta with the help of the new 
organization Alpha-B. One of our interviewees mentioned the dominant role of Alpha Holding in 
the final decision making:  
We have some, the SVP from Beta and Alpha to discuss where to go. Finally, these people 
take the decision, this is in a very high level...but finally, the board members (of Alpha 
Holding) will make the decisions. 
Interestingly however, there was no clear line between Alpha Holding and Alpha. Alpha Holding 
was seen as a “virtual” administrative organization, that was to say, there was just a board of 
directors in the Alpha Holding, and Alpha was the mainly business entity. Thus Alpha and Alpha 
Holding were not divided and they were seen as the same organization. For instance, one of our 
interviewees mentioned that: 
We have Alpha Holding and Alpha. But actually, from the perspective of an internal 
organizational member, we have a “virtual” Holding, we don't have a big organizational 
entity as a Holding. We just have a board of directors there in Alpha Holding ... there is 
not a bunch of entities under the Holding group. Our business entity is actually Alpha …no 
matter how Alpha Holding expanded, the business entity is still Alpha. Thus, we are, we 
are the same. 
  
2. Organizational Identity Flexibility 
Non-merging identities: Minimizing the identity disruptions of the acquired company  
After the acquisition, the two organizations kept running their businesses independently by their 
own management teams. Keeping the identities of Alpha and Beta separate was out of two main 
reasons. On the one hand, non-merging identity helped to protect the brand identity of Beta. Alpha 
and Beta managers remain distinct identities in terms of their brand after the acquisition. Chinese 
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managers admitted that Alpha was a “cheap” and “low quality” brand, while Beta was a luxury 
brand that represented refined products. For example, one of our interviewees mentioned: 
His (Chairman) strategy is to prevent the brand of Beta from being hurt because of Alpha 
brand (which was of course not a luxury brand) …So he (Chairman) separated the 
management of two companies and runs them independently…There are actually too many 
favorable factors for us. For example, our brand has been improved a lot in the market. 
Because…as a Chinese independent brand, we acquired a foreign luxury brand.  
On the other hand, the identity disruption to Beta was perceived as a risk by Chinese 
managers. Alpha was a traditional Chinese company with a high managerial hierarchy, whereas 
Beta was a typical western democratic, discussion-oriented corporation. It was difficult to manage 
the two companies with massive cultural differences after the acquisition. They kept the respective 
cultures and management styles for both organizations. Non-merging identities prevented 
inappropriate integration from destroying the acquisition. One of our informants claimed that: 
This strategy (separation) is very good. If a company doesn’t have a good strategy after the 
acquisition, it will be an unsuccessful acquisition…there are too many failure cases in 
Chinese cross-border mergers and acquisitions, we might ruin the whole acquisition 
without it (the non-merging strategy). 
Bridge identity: connecting non-merging identities  
Though non-merging identity was believed to be helpful for maintaining the uniqueness of Beta 
after the acquisition, the separated identities of the two organizations gave rise to a challenge of 
knowledge transfer and collaborations. One of our interviewees mentioned that: 
This is another classic issue. it takes quite a long time to find an agreement about the way 
Beta discloses their knowledge and technology. Yeah. Even though one organization (Beta) 
belongs to the other (Alpha), we are still different organizations. It’s not easy to disclose 
their technology and their knowledge…it is a big issue for us.  
Thus, Alpha-B was created in the same location as Beta, acting as a bridge between two 
organizations without breaking the “non-merging” principle. The Alpha-B connected two “non-
merging” identities, and brought some positive outcomes. Firstly, Alpha-B connected employees 
from two organizations for communications. For example, some Beta managers were recruited by 
Alpha-B, thus Chinese managers had chances to get touch with Beta managers directly at Alpha-
B. Indeed, for Beta managers, having a job at Alpha-B was more acceptable than working at Alpha 
in China. In this way, Alpha successfully built their new R&D team. One of our interviewees stated 
that:  
 In the past, it (Alpha) might be just like some companies such as Z (their competitor). They 
(Z) are completely copying and reproducing, and they didn’t have their own research and 
development teams. After creating Alpha-B, we built a research and development team in 
China. 
Secondly, Alpha-B connected two organizations by making knowledge transfer possible. 
Knowledge transfer from Beta to Alpha would involve data transmission and intellectual property 
(IP) protection issues. With a concern for legally protection of IP in which China has not completed 
legislation yet, Beta managers were more willing to cooperate with Alpha-B in terms of technology. 
Data and technology were seen as safe and controllable when they were transmitted to ALPHA-B 
because of a strict IP law. For instance, as one of our informants stated: 
 Yes, Alpha-B, yes. this company, on the one hand, solved the issue from Beta. Beta had 
some concern about the IP, IP leakage or something like this. For Alpha, we need this kind 
of technology transfer. So Alpha-B is playing a very important role in this. Maybe later we 
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will have a new way to cooperate, a new way will be come up with… but Alpha-B is a real 
milestone of the cooperation …  
Interestingly, Chinese managers demonstrated a salient “learning” identity after Alpha-B’s 
connecting Alpha and Beta. They showed a strong motivation to learn from Beta. Alpha learned 
technological know-how from Beta, including the technology standard, quality control and R&D 
processes. The learnt know-how was transformed into Alpha’s self-applicable knowledge via 
Alpha-B. This “learning identity” held by Chinese managers contributed to Alpha’s technological 
improvements and process upgrades. Specifically, western countries had a relatively stable and 
well-developed market. Beta was a process-driven organization, that was to say, how many tasks 
and steps employees needed to do for a new product were prescribed in the process system. As a 
young and emerging company in the industry, Alpha did not have mature R&D processes. In order 
to improve the efficiency and quality of production, Chinese managers upgraded the production 
processes based on Beta’s process system. Besides, fierce competition and changing markets in 
China were not allowing Chinese companies to work step by step referring to the process. In this 
perspective, Alpha showed a strong ability to learn and integrate more advanced processes into 
their self-applicable R&D routines. For example, one of our interviewees stated: 
We didn’t know how to do - they (Beta) knew. But Alpha, we didn’t know. We tried to learn 
from them, built the new organization, new process, new standard and new templates, and 
new governance structure, meeting structure, everything. 
OR 
From the perspective of the domestic market… It was just like what I had said to you. In 
our collaboration, Alpha undoubtedly learned the standardized development process from 
Beta, these areas such as the quality awareness, etc. are enhanced. That is a big leap. 
In sum, the new organization Alpha-B was accepted as a bridge to connect two non-merging 
identities. The Alpha-B was quickly accepted as Alpha’s European subsidiary by Chinese 
managers, since they were getting more and more involved in the daily work in Alpha-B. One 
Chinese managers had two positions with respective responsibilities both in Alpha and Alpha-B. 
For example: 
Alpha-B is actually a subsidiary of Alpha. However, at the beginning of its establishment, 
it was created as a bridge. That is to say, we would like to transfer Beta's technology to 
Alpha. That is the meaning of the organizational structure change by creating an Alpha-B, 
it brings the Beta technology, experience, and development ideas to Alpha.  
Merged identity: Alpha-C - non-merging identities were integrated 
The creation of Alpha-B witnessed Alpha’s flexibility in changing the organizational structure to 
enhance organizational adaptation after the acquisition. Importantly, with Alpha’s agility in the 
organizational structure, a new joint venture – Alpha-C - was established for facilitating a more 
direct and deeper collaboration between Alpha and Beta. Though Alpha-B played a significant role 
as a bridge to connect two companies, it was seen as “a cooperation trial” between two 
organizations. Thus, further synergies were perceived as necessary for the future success after the 
acquisition. Specifically, the new organization Alpha-C was responsible for the direct collaboration 
of further technology sharing, scale economy, synergies and building a win-win situation for both 
organizations. The one-way “learning” identity was switched to a two-way “mutual learning” in 
the new organization Alpha-C. For instance, one of our interviewees remarked that: 
On the one hand, this joint venture is to break the technology barrier and promote the 
integration of technology. On the other hand, it is created to lower the cost for Beta and 
achieve economies of scale, this is what Beta can learn from Alpha in this cooperation.  
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After the creation of Alpha-C, some Alpha managers worked in the joint team with Beta 
managers without going through Alpha-B. Interestingly, Alpha-B was described as the “test 
marriage” between two organizations. This new joint venture Alpha-C was seen as Alpha’s “formal 
marriage” with Beta. Our interviewees mentioned that “two organizations were becoming a joint 
team” and call Beta managers as “our team members”. Thus the new joint venture integrated non-
merging identities (Alpha identity and Beta identity). For instance, one of our interviewees 
mentioned that: 
On the one hand, Alpha-C is an organization overcoming this barrier of the technology and 
the enhancement of exchange and integration of these technologies at the same time. On 
the other hand, it is the integration of the purchasing area – joint purchasing. For Beta, 
this is a very meaningful thing. That’s a trial and error or an experiment. This is because 
the domestic ability to lower the costs of purchasing is very strong. It will bring about cost 
reduction for the entire Beta products. And it will also be very effective as well. 
Notably, except for the agility in organizational structure, Alpha was agile in terms of 
meeting customers’ requirements. Speed and flexibility were claimed as the soul of Alpha. 
Specifically, Alpha demonstrated considerable agility to the fast changing Chinese market by 
responding and fulfilling to customers’ requirements quickly and efficiently. For example, Alpha 
underwent organizational changes to satisfy the needs of Chinese customers by updating facilities 
and shortening working processes. Notably, they provided immediate and personalized 
modification of designed product models if these models failed to meet the customers’ individual 
needs. The level of agility was much lower (or partly inexistent) in Beta and other competitors. 
Some of our interviewees mentioned that: 
If the user says I need something like this. Then my manager will ask the engineer to change 
it right now, and it can be changed at the fastest time. At the end of the day, the user is very 
happy about it. Users realize that Alpha can do the things they want very quickly. If you go 
to any company, you go to Gamma (one competitor), you go to Beta, it's impossible...so 
when Alpha loses this kind of flexibility, I feel that this company cannot be alive, it cannot 
be alive.  
 
3. Post-merger identification  
Chinese managers identified with their organization’s vision of becoming a respected brand in the 
global market. Most Alpha managers were proud to see a local brand occupying the domestic 
market and with a target of the global market. Before the acquisition, Alpha was an unknown or 
even a not respected brand due to its low-quality products and unsophisticated technology. On one 
hand, acquiring a western premium brand Beta caused a sensation in the whole industry. Learning 
advanced technology from Beta via Alpha-B was helping Alpha get rid of their bad image of poor 
quality. On the other hand, the Alpha brand was clearly recognized in the market, Alpha launched 
new products in Alpha-B to differentiate itself from the local brand. With an improvement of 
technology, new products launched in Alpha-B received a good evaluation in terms of quality. 
After the acquisition, Alpha was described as “the new Alpha”, from a status unrespectable to a 
benchmark in the market. Thus, the vision was seen as highly promising for employees in Alpha 
and Chinese managers mentioned that they had a strong identification towards “the new Alpha”: 
I am happy to work for Alpha and I saw the fast development of Alpha, I am proud of the 
good brand of Alpha, there is a good improvement for Alpha, I really like the developed 
and post-merger Alpha, nobody likes to fall behind. 
OR 
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We are proud of the development of Alpha, from the old Alpha which was laughed at and 
unrecognized to a benchmark in the market, we are so proud of Alpha; you will feel so 
proud when you tell people that you worked for Alpha，I am proud that I experience the 
period and I am the one who contributed to this.  
 Besides, the organization was described as a highly competitive company which was more 
flexible and efficient than their competitors. One of our informants mentioned:  
What I am most proud of... In fact, is that every one of us who are in the industry hopes to 
see a local brand that can firstly occupy the Chinese market, then go to the world or 
different markets. I think this is a dream of many people. In fact, we are still on the way to 
chase this dream, but I believe that one day we will realize it. Because it is indeed that we 
find Alpha... its culture, and the speed, the flexibility, there are not many companies can 
keep up. Even for some mature companies, they can't keep up. 
In sum, Chinese managers showed a high post-merger identification by acquiring technology, 
entering into new markets and launching high-quality products after the acquisition. Chinese 
managers identified more and more with their organization comparing with the pre-acquisition 
organization. One of our employees stated: 
It shows that Alpha has indeed produced its own business card that was made in China 
with a high reputation. In my opinion… when you mention Japan in the industry, it is known 
as J and B (popular brand in Japan). When you mention Korea, it is Y (popular brand in 
Korea). I hope that, in the future, when you mention China, people will mention us, Alpha. 
 
Discussion  
The current findings have important theoretical implications for the study of post-merger 
identification. Defined as “a formal recategorization of two social groups as one new group” (Van 
Knippenberg et al., 2002, p. 234), M&As typically represent dramatic organizational changes for 
employees. Existing studies suggest that uncertainties about organizational changes in M&As often 
relate to employees’ reduced post-merger identification (PMI) (Amiot, Terry and McKimmie, 
2012). Organizational changes per se is not always a bad thing, but employees’ feeling that “they 
are still working for the same organization (e.g. their pre-merger organization)” might lost due to 
the changes. (Rousseau, 1998) calls the relevant feeling as a sense of continuity which is essential 
to maintain PMI (see also Van Knippenberg et al., 2002). The loss of the sense of continuity could 
make employees disincline to contribute to the new organization (Colman and Lunnan, 2011) and 
lead to their low PMI (Terry, Carey and Callan, 2001; Colman and Lunnan, 2011).  
 Typically, the members from the dominated or lower status organization(s) experience a 
relatively low sense of continuity (Boen, Vanbeselaere and Cool, 2006). (Colman and Lunnan, 
2011) explain that low status pre-merger group tends to face uncertainties about their future 
organization, as they thought they have to follow the other group’s identity.  In turn, the dominate 
or high status group often have a high sense of continuity, because they have more resources and 
power to keep their identity (Van Knippenberg et al., 2002).  
 Interestingly, though the dominant organization may be the higher status group in M&As, 
Van Knippenberg et al. (2002) differentiated them with a special example (e.g. when a chain of 
budget stores takes over a prestigious designer store). Addressing this condition, a chain of budget 
stores is the dominate organization (more powerful) and the low status group (inferior in terms of 
design) at the same time. But there is no deeper explanation on how this mixed status and 
dominance will influence employees’ PMI in M&As. This theoretical gap should not be ignored 
also because of its practical necessity, as less distinguished companies from emerging markets are 
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increasingly acquiring distinguished western companies (Kale, 2004; Luo and Tung, 2007; Sun, 
2018), how to deal with the mixed effects of dominance and status on PMI become vital to their 
success of M&As. 
 The current findings fill this gap, we found that understanding the organizational identity 
flexibility could help employees to reconstruct a strong sense of organizational identification after 
defining their group as a dominant but low status organization. In our case, on one hand, as the 
acquirer, Alpha Holding acted as a dominate group because of having more power and financial 
resources, interestingly, Chinese managers thought Alpha had no difference with Alpha Holding, 
“Alpha Holding is just a board of directors, Alpha is Alpha Holding”. Thus, perceiving their 
organization as same as the dominant group, Alpha managers could easily keep their sense of 
continuity which would be helpful for building up a PMI. This is consistent with the previous 
finding that dominate group can keep their continuity and PMI after the acquisition (Van 
Knippenberg et al., 2002).  
 On the other hand, Chinese managers perceived Alpha as a low status group after M&As, 
because their inferior technology, brand and process. That was to say, Chinese managers accepted 
their low status as rational after intergroup comparisons with the acquired company. This finding 
is similar to (Ellemers, Wilke and Van Knippenberg, 1993) who found that group members 
considered their low status more acceptable when it seemed legitimate. However, according to 
Amiot (2007), intergroup comparisons would make the low-status group experience identity threats 
after the acquisition and it would be difficult for them to get a PMI (see Navis & Glynn, 2010). 
Our study extends this finding by introducing the role of organizational identity flexibility on PMI 
for low status groups. We define “organizational identity flexibility” as “organizational identity is 
flexible enough to adapt to dramatic organizational changes” In our case, as a low status group, 
Chinese managers were not threatened by the uncertainties about “which organization they are 
going to belong to after the acquisition”. They accepted that identities should be non-merged in the 
beginning. Though acquisition was an opportunity for their (low status) identity enhancement 
(Boen, Vanbeselaere and Cool, 2006), this would require organizational transformation which 
typically undergoes major changes, which might lead to a low PMI. However, the “DNA” of 
change was planted in Alpha. For instance, a new organization Alpha-B was created and accepted 
as a bridge to connect non-merging identity. For the sake of the further synergy, Alpha-C was 
established to merge two identities. Thus, organizational changes were not threats anymore for 
Chinese managers, the PMI was constructed. 
 In addition, the current findings also help us to take a new look at the concept of sense of 
continuity (Rousseau, 1998). In order to elicit PMI, previous literatures focus mainly on 
investigating how to avoid organizational identity change and keep the sense of continuity (Van 
Knippenberg et al., 2002; Iyer and Jetten, 2011). However, M&As inevitably represent dramatic 
organizational changes. As such, employees are likely to experience a sense of discontinuity or 
strong ambiguity about their future organizational identity after the acquisition (Terry, 2001). The 
current findings suggest that “organizational identity flexibility” can help employees to be more 
immunizing instead of resisting the organizational changes and finally contribute to the PMI. In 
our case, although organizational changes were happening, the “DNA” of Chinese managers 
(flexible identity) stayed the same, thus their identity was in fact the identity of change. 
Differentiated with past literatures, Chinese organization, as the acquirer, didn’t try to keep their 
continuity based on their advantages (e.g. they are richer, more resource based), on the country, 
“change is their identity continuity”, they were open to change themselves in terms of technology, 
organizational processes and structures.  
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 Importantly, prior works investigating pre-merger status/dominance on PMI adopted 
mainly quantitative method (Ellemers, Wilke and Van Knippenberg, 1993; Boen, Vanbeselaere 
and Cool, 2006; Amiot, Terry and McKimmie, 2012; Lipponen, Wisse and Jetten, 2017). From the 
social identity perspective, this finding extends previous research by using qualitative data to 
investigate how PMI was constructed in low status/dominated organization. 
 This finding is theoretically important because dramatic changes happen in M&As, 
resulting in a relative low status or dominance for at least one organization (Kale, 2004). And it is 
still a puzzle for identity construction in a dominate but low status group in M&As. It is also 
practically interesting, as less distinguished companies from emerging markets are increasingly 
acquiring distinguished western companies, how to deal with the mixed effects of dominance and 
status become vital to their success of M&As.  
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